Public Choice Theory
- Credits: 6
- Ending: Examination
- Range: 2P + 2C
- Semester: summer
- Year: 1
- Faculty of Economics and Finance
Teachers
Included in study programs
Teaching results
Teaching results:
Course objective
The aim of the course is to provide students with systematic and analytically based knowledge of the functioning of political and public institutions from the perspective of economic theory. The course focuses on the application of public choice theory and new institutional economics in the analysis of decision-making by voters, politicians, political parties, and bureaucracy in democratic political systems. Emphasis is placed on understanding the mechanisms of resource allocation in the public sector, identifying the causes of inefficiency in public institutions, and assessing the impact of political decisions on economic performance and the functioning of society.
Knowledge
Graduates from the course have advanced knowledge of public choice theory, political economy, and new institutional economics. They understand the economic principles of the functioning of the political market, voting and electoral mechanisms, the behavior of political actors and bureaucracy, as well as the process of resource allocation in the public sector. They are familiar with theoretical explanations of the failures of public institutions, the phenomenon of rent-seeking, and the relationship between political decisions and economic performance.
Competencies
Students acquire the competence to analyze the functioning of political and public institutions using the tools of public choice theory and institutional economics. They are able to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative collective decision-making mechanisms, identify the limitations of democratic voting processes, and assess the impact of political decisions on resource allocation and economic performance. The competencies they acquire enable them to formulate analytically based conclusions and recommendations for public policy and public sector management.
Skills
Students will acquire the skills to apply theoretical models of public choice to the analysis of specific cases from the practice of the public sector and political decision-making. They will be able to work with relevant data and information, interpret the results of political-economic analyses, and critically assess the behavior of actors in the political market. They will be able to present their analytical conclusions, defend them on the basis of economic arguments, and work effectively in a team to solve complex public problems.
Indicative content
Indicative content:
1. Subject, origin, and development of public choice theory
2. Methodology of public choice theory
3. Political market and comparison of private and political markets
4. Individual preferences and their manifestations in the political market
5. Alternative indicators of preferences
6. Voting and decision-making mechanisms
7. Behavior of politicians and political parties
8. Economic theory of bureaucracy
9. Decision-making on the allocation of resources in time on the political market
10. Provision of public and mixed goods, state paternalism
11. Rent seeking
12. Constitutional economics and economic performance
13. Comparison of private and political markets.
Topics of seminars are aligned with the topics of lectures.
Support literature
Literature:
Compulsory readings:
Čaplánová, A., et al. (2011). Teória verejnej voľby. Bratislava: Ekonóm.
Johnson, D. B. (1998). Teória verejnej voľby: Úvod do novej politickej ekonómie. Bratislava: SOFA. ISBN 80-85752-43-3.
Johnson, D. B. (2010). Public choice: An introduction to the new political economy (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Suggested readings:
Barr, N. (2020). The economics of the welfare state (6th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Caplan, B. D. (2010). Mýtus racionálního voliče: Proč v demokracii vítězí špatná politika. Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny.
Fisher, R. C. (2007). State and local public finance (3rd ed.). Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western.
Heckelman, J. C. (Ed.). (2004). Readings in public choice economics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Michelko, R. (2022). Alternatívne politické systémy. Martin: Littera.
Schram, A. (2002). Experimental public choice. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2002-106/1. Retrieved from http://papers.tinbergen.nl/02106.pdf
Turnovec, F. (2003). Public choice: Models, methods and applications. Praha: Karolinum.
Requirements to complete the course
Requirements to complete the course:
Seminar activities – 10 %
Final exam – 60 %
Date of approval: 27.02.2025
Date of the latest change: 22.01.2026